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POSTSCRIPT
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NORTH CAROLINA
SAM J. ERVIN, JR.t
As the recent award of punitive damages in the Carol Burnett-
National Enquirer suit demonstrates, the allowance ofpunitive damages
can have a large financial impact on a defendant and a potentially
greater deterrent effect on others. In this Postscript to our Survey of
North Carolina lawformer Senator Ervin pro vides a detailed summary
of the law on punitive damages in North Carolina It is hoped that this
summary will be a valuable research aid, especially to the practitioners
and judges of this State.
Punitive damages are totally unlike nominal or compensatory damages.
Nominal damages are awarded to a plaintiff by a jury as a matter of right
when he shows that the defendant has committed a legal wrong against him,
but there is no evidence that actual damages resulted from it. The award of
nominal damages vindicates the plaintif's right.1 As the name implies, com-
pensatory damages are awarded to the plaintiff by the jury as a matter of right
to make good or replace the loss caused him by the defendant's actionable
legal wrong.2 As its various names disclose, punitive damages, also known as
exemplary damages, vindictive damages, or smart money, are vengeful in na-
ture and are allowable by the jury in a proper case for example's sake.
North Carolina decisions consistently elaborate upon this vengeful nature
of punitive damages and their deterrent objectives.
Punitive damages are never awarded as compensation. They are
awarded above and beyond actual damages, as a punishment for the
defendant's intentional wrong. They are given to the plaintiff in a
proper case, not because they are due, but because of the opportunity
the case affords the court to inflict punishment for conduct intention-
ally wrongful.
3
t Former U.S. Senator. A.B. 1917, University of North Carolina; LL.B. 1922, Harvard,
LL.D.; various universities. I would like to thank Laura Cauble, a third-year law student at the
University of North Carolina School of Law, for her assistance in preparing this summary.
1. Chaffin v. Fries Mfg. & Power Co., 135 N.C. 95, 47 S.E. 226 (1904).
2. Newsome v. Western Union Tel. Co., 153 N.C. 153, 69 S.E. 10 (1910); Hinson v. Smith,
118 N.C. 503, 24 S.E. 541 (1896). See also Brandis & Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading
Damages in North Carolina, 31 N.C.L. Rav. 249 (1953).
3. Ovemite Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 30, 125 S.E.2d 277,
286 (1962). Other North Carolina decisions elaborate upon the vengeful nature of punitive dam-
ages and their deterrent objectives in these quotations: "North Carolina has consistently allowed
punitive damages solely on the basis of its policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter
others from similar behavior." Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d
297, 302 (1976); "It is generally held that punitive damages are those damages which are given in
addition to compensatory damages because of the 'wanton, reckless, malicious, or oppressive char-
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Thus a jury has the discretionary power in a proper case to award punitive
damages for this two-fold purpose: First, to punish defendant's aggravated or
outrageous conduct that characterized his commission of the actionable legal
wrong against the plaintiff or his property, and second, to deter others from
similar offenses.
4
North Carolina, however, deems the doctrine of punitive damages an
anomaly in law. Though decisions have given punitive damages an estab-
lished place in North Carolina jurisprudence, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has indicated its unwillingness to expand the doctrine beyond the limi-
tations imposed by authoritative decisions of the court.5 The North Carolina
decisions have established these rules:
1. With the exception of a breach of a contract to marry and the failure
of a public service company to perform an obligation imposed upon it by its
public franchise, punitive damages can never be awarded for simple breach of
acter of the acts complained of'... . Such damages generally go beyond compensatory damages,
and they are usually allowed to punish defendant and deter others." Oestreicher v. American
Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 134,225 S.E.2d 797, 807 (1976) (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2DDamages
§ 236 (1965)); "Vindictive or punitive damages are treated as an award by way of punishment to
the offender and as a warning to other wrongdoers. ... Smith v. Myers, 188 N.C. 551, 552, 125
S.E. 178, 179 (1924); "Punitive damages, as the descriptive name clearly implies, are awarded as a
punishment. They are never awarded as compensation. 'They are awarded above and beyond
actual damages, as a punishment for the defendant's intentional wrong. They are given to the
plaintiff in a proper case, not because they are due, but because of the opportunity the case affords
the court to inflict punishment for conduct intentionally wrongful."' Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698,701-02,220 S.E.2d 403, 406(1975) (quoting Overnite Transp. Co.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 30, 125 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1962)). See also Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 34 N.C. App. 96, 237 S.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 589, 239
S.E.2d 263 (1977).
4. A multitude of North Carolina decisions recognize and enforce the rule that punitive
damages are allowable by a jury in the exercise of its discretion to punish the defendant for his
aggravated or outrageous conduct and to deter others from similar offenses. See, e.g., Hardy v.
Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); Woody v. Catawba Valley Broadcasting Co., 272 N.C.
459, 158 S.E.2d 578 (1968); Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E.2d 186 (1964); Hinson v. Daw-
son, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956); Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785
(1953); Walters v. Western Union Tel. Co., 194 N.C. 188, 138 S.E. 608 (1927); Cotten v. Fisheries
Prod. Co., 181 N.C. 188, 106 S.E. 487 (1921); Carmichael v. Bell Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619
(1911); Tuggle v. Haines, 26 N.C. App. 365, 216 S.E.2d 460 (1975). See also Brandis & Trotter,
supra note 2; Note, Damages-Fraud and Deceit-Recovery of Punitive Damages/ar Fraud and
Deceit, 31 N.C.L. REv. 473 (1953).
5. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 27, 92 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1956). This is one of the authori-
tative decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court on punitive damages. Speaking for a unan-
imous Court, Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Bobbitt clearly stated North Carolina's policy
respecting such damages:
No North Carolina statute defines the bases for the recovery of punitive damages.
The soundness of the doctrine has been challenged and defended.. . . It is challenged
because it enables the injured party to recover more than full compensatory damages.
Hence, such damages are sometimes called vindictive damages. It is defended as a
needed deterent to wrongdoing in addition to that provided by criminal punishment.
Hence, such damages are sometimes called exemplary damages or smart money. Stacy,
C.J., in Worthy v. Knight, (210 N.C. 498, 187 S.E. 771), characterized the doctrine as an
anomaly; but the many decisions cited in his opinion as well as later decisions give it an
established place in our law. Even so, we are not disposed to expand the doctrine be-
yond the limits established by authoritative decisions of this Court.
Id at 26-27, 92 S.E.2d at 396. See also Survey ofNorth Carolina Case Law--Punitive Damages, 35
N.C.L. Rav. 223 (1957).
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contract.6 If a breach of contract is the result of tortious conduct, however,
punitive damages may be awarded to punish the tortious conduct, but the con-
duct must be aggravated beyond that necessary to be merely tortious.
7
2. Punitive damages can be awarded against a corporation for a tort
wantonly committed by its agent in the course of his employment.8
3. Since punitive damages are not designed to compensate the plaintiff,
but are allowable by the jury to punish the defendant and deter others, puni-
tive damages can never be recovered by the plaintiff as a matter of right.9
4. The complaint must allege facts or elements that would justify the
award of punitive damages, such as actual malice, oppression, gross and will-
ful wrong or negligence, or a reckless and wanton disregard of plaintiffs
rights. Though no specific form of allegation is required,10 whether the facts
stated in the complaint are sufficient to bring the case within the rule allowing
punitive damages is a question of law for the court.I
5. Whether there is any evidence to be submitted to the jury that would
justify assessment of punitive damages, and whether an award of punitive
damages is excessive, are questions for the court.
12
6. If the pleadings and evidence so warrant, an issue over punitive dam-
ages should be submitted to the jury. The jury is then to determine whether
punitive damages in any amount should be awarded, and if so, the amount of
the award. These matters are determinable by the jury in its discretion. 13
6. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976); King v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 159 S.E.2d 891 (1968); Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723,
73 S.E.2d 785 (1953); Mesimer v. Stancil, 45 N.C. App. 533, 263 S.E.2d 32 (1980). See also Survey
of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1976-Tarts, 55 N.C.L. REv. 895, 1088, 1090-1091
(1977); Comment, "Extra-Contractual" Remediesfor Breach of Contract in North Carolina, 55
N.C.L. REv. 1125 (1977); Brandis & Trotter, supra note 2, at 268; Note, supra note 4; Note,
Damages-Punitive Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 11 N.C.L. Rv. 160 (1933).
7. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins.
Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976); Mesimer v. Stancil, 45 N.C. App. 533, 263 S.E.2d 32
(1980); East Coast Dev. Corp. v. Alderman-250 Corp., 30 N.C. App. 598, 606, 228 S.E.2d 72, 79
(1976). See also Survey oDevelopments in North Carolina Law, 1976-Torts, supra note 6; Com-
ment, supra note 6; Note, supra note 4.
8. Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 416, 424, 163 S.E.2d 761, 767 (1968); Binder v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894 (1943).
9. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 134, 225 S.E.2d 797, 807-08
(1976); King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 159 S.E.2d 891 (1968); Woody v. Catawba
Valley Broadcasting Co., 272 N.C. 459, 158 S.E.2d 578 (1968); Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 134
S.E.2d 186 (1964); Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956); Swinton v. Savoy Realty
Co., 236 N.C. 723,73 S.E.2d 785 (1953); Worthy v. Knight, 210 N.C. 498, 187 S.E. 771 (1936); East
Coast Dev. Corp. v. Alderman-250 Corp., 30 N.C. App. 598, 228 S.E.2d 72 (1976).
10. Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 172, 147 S.E.2d 910, 915 (1966). Accord, Clemmons v. Life
Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 416, 423-25, 163 S.E.2d 761, 766-67 (1968); Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 93
S.E.2d 393 (1956); Lutz Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955);
Girard Trust Bank v. Easton, 3 N.C. App. 414, 165 S.E.2d 252 (1969). See also Brandis & Trotter,
supra note 2, at 250.
11. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1976).
12. Worthy v. knight, 210 N.C. 498, 187 S.E. 771 (1936).
13. Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 35, 134 S.E.2d 186, 190 (1963); Hinson v. Dawson, 244
N.C. 23, 26, 92 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1956). Accord, Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105,
229 S.E.2d 297 (1976); Oestreicher v. American Nat'1 Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797
(1976); Harris v. Queen City Coach Co., 220 N.C. 67, 16 S.E.2d 464 (1941); Tripp v. American
Tobacco Co., 193 N.C. 614, 137 S.E. 871 (1927); Cotten v. Fisheries Prod. Co., 181 N.C. 188, 106
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Since they may be awarded in proper cases "in the sound discretion of the jury
and within reasonable limits,"'1 4 the amount of punitive damages awarded
"may not be excessively proportionate to the circumstances of contumely and
indignity in the particular case."'15 The approved practice is to submit to the
jury the compensatory damages and punitive damages issues separately. 16
7. The jury has the discretionary power to refrain from awarding puni-
tive damages even if the evidence indicates aggravating or outrageous conduct
by the defendant.
17
8. Punitive damages cannot be recovered by the plaintiff unless the jury
finds that the defendant committed an actionable legal wrong against the
plaintiff or his property and awards the plaintiff either compensatory or nomi-
nal damages.' 8
9. The jury has no right to allow punitive damages unless they conclude
from the evidence that the wrongful act was accomplished by fraud, malice,
recklessness, or other unlawful and wanton aggravation by the defendant.' 9
As noted above, punitive damages cannot be awarded unless a cause of
action otherwise exists and at least nominal damages are recovered by the
plaintiff.20 These circumstances alone, however, do not justify an award of
punitive damages. 21 Since the Supreme Court of North Carolina first consid-
ered the question of punitive damages in 1797,22 it has been established con-
clusively that the discretionary power of the jury to assess punitive damages
against the defendant does not exist in any action unless the legal wrong was
S.E. 487 (1921); Hodges v. Hall, 172 N.C. 29, 89 S.E. 802 (1916); Hayes v. Southern R.R. Co., 141
N.C. 195, 53 S.E. 847 (1906); Wylie v. Smitherman, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 236 (1848).
14. Blackwood v. Cates, 297 N.C. 163, 167, 254 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1979).
15. Tripp v. American Tobacco Co., 193 N.C. 614, 137 S.E. 871 (1927); Ford v. McAnally,
182 N.C. 4f9, 109 S.E. 91 (1921). See also Brandis & Trotter, supra note 2, at 250, 254.
16. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956). Punitive damages issues are set
forth in these cases: Ford v. McAnally, 182 N.C. 419, 109 S.E. 91 (1921); Cobb v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co., 175 N.C. 130, 95 S.E. 92 (1918); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 73 S.E. 206 (1911);
Hayes v. Southern R.R. Co., 141 N.C. 195, 53 S.E. 847 (1906).
17. Robinson v. McAlhaney, 214 N.C. 180, 198 S.E. 647 (1938).
18. Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E.2d 761 (1968); Parris v. H.G. Fischer
Co., 221 N.C. 110, 19 S.E.2d 128 (1942); Worthy v. Knight, 210 N.C. 498, 187 S.E. 771 (1936);
Webb v. Western Union Tel. Co., 167 N.C. 483, 83 S.E. 568 (1914); Phillips v. Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 56, 257 S.E.2d 671 (1979). See also Comment, Punitive Damages
and The Dnxken Driver, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 117, 123-26 (1980).
19. Hayes v. Southern R.R. Co., 141 N.C. 195,53 S.E. 847 (1906). Accord, Hairston v. Atlan-
tic Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 18 S.E.2d 166 (1942); Harris v. Queen City Coach Co., 220
N.C. 67, 16 S.E.2d 464 (1941); Robinson v. McAlhaney, 214 N.C. 180, 198 S.E. 647 (1938); Smith
v. Morganton Ice Co., 159 N.C. 151, 74 S.E. 961 (1912). See also Brandis & Trotter, supra note 2,
at 250.
20. Worthy v. Knight, 210 N.C. 498, 187 S.E. 771 (1936).
21. Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953). The court observed:
Smart money may not be included in the assessment of damages as a matter of course
simply because of an actionable wrong, but "only when there are some features of aggra-
vation, as when the wrong is done wilfully or under circumstances of rudeness or oppres-
sion, or in a manner which evinces a reckless and wanton disregard of plaintifi's rightsl"
Id. at 725, 73 S.E.2d at 787. See also Note, supra note 4.
22. Carruthers v. Tillman, 2 N.C. (I Hayw.) 501 (1797).
1258 [Vol. 59
PUNITIVE DAMA 1G259
also characterized by aggravating or outrageous conduct by the defendant.23
More recent decisions hold that a defendant is guilty of aggravating or
outrageous conduct within the meaning of the rules governing the award of
punitive damages if he commits the wrong "'willfully or under circumstances
of rudeness or oppression, or in a manner which evinces a reckless and wanton
disregard of the plaintiffs rights.' 24 Earlier decisions use varying phraseol-
ogy to define what constitutes aggravating or outrageous conduct by a wrong-
doer. When he wrote his illuminating opinion in Hinson v. Dawson,25 Justice
(afterwards Chief Justice) Bobbitt reconciled and clarified these decisions by
stating that the defendant's conduct is aggravating or outrageous within the
purview of the law of punitive damages when he commits the actionable legal
wrong against the plaintiff or his property wilfully, wantonly or maliciously.26
23. See, e.g., Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976) (fraud);
Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976) (fraud); Hardy v.
Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975) (fraud); Woody v. Catawba Valley Broadcasting Co.,
272 N.C. 459, 158 S.E.2d 578 (1968) (defamation); Van Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 261
N.C. 539, 135 S.E.2d 640 (1964) (appropriating land); General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Distribu-
tors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459, 117 S.E.2d 479 (1960) (seizing goods); Binder v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894 (1943) (conversion of automobile); Hairston v. Atlantic
Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 18 S.E.2d 166 (1942) (assault and battery); Harris v. Queen City
Coach Co., 220 N.C. 67, 16 S.E.2d 464 (1941) (public service company refusing to transport plain-
tiff); Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N.C. 567, 5 S.E.2d 828 (1939) (public service company
causing a woman passenger and her child to alight in a lonely place short of her destination);
Robinson v. McAlhaney, 214 N.C. 180, 198 S.E. 647 (1938) (assault and battery); Worthy v.
Knight, 210 N.C. 498, 187 S.E. 771 (1936) (assault and battery); Lay v. Gazette Publishing Co.,
209 N.C. 134, 183 S.E. 416 (1936) (defamation); Smith v. Myers, 188 N.C. 551, 125 S.E. 178 (1924)
(assault and battery); Ford v. McAnally, 182 N.C. 419, 109 S.E. 91 (1921) (conductor rudely refus-
ing to help aged and infirm passenger to alight); Cotten v. Fisheries Prod. Co., 181 N.C. 188, 106
S.E. 487 (1921) (defamation); Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 175 N.C. 130, 95 S.E. 92 (1918)
(nuisance by blasting); Hodges v. Hall, 172 N.C. 29, 89 S.E. 802 (1916) (assault and battery);
Smith v. Morganton Ice Co., 159 N.C. 151, 74 S.E. 961 (1912) (restraint of trade contrary to state
antitrust law); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 73 S.E. 206 (1911) (nuisance by blasting); Carmi-
chael v. Bell TeL Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619 (1911) (public seivice company refusing service);
Hayes v. Southern R.R. Co., 141 N.C. 195, 53 S.E. 847 (1906) (railroad using excessive force to
eject hobo); Holmes v. Carolina Central R.R., 94 N.C. 318 (1886) (railroad using excessive force to
eject a man); Louder v. Hinson, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 369 (1857) (assault and battery on a woman);
Wylie v. Smitherman,.30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 236 (1848) (burning county courthouse); Duncan v.
Stalcup, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 440 (1836) (shooting livestock); Russel v. Taylor, 37 N.C. App.
520, 246 S.E.2d 569 (1978) (conversion of a mobile home); Robinson v. Duszynski, 36 N.C. App.
103, 243 S.E.2d 148 (1978) (medical malpractice); East Coast Dev. Corp. v. Alderman-250 Corp.,
30 N.C. App. 598, 228 S.E.2d 72 (1976) (breach of contract). See also Comment, supra note 6.
24. Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 725, 73 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1953) (fraud) (quot-
ing Baker v. Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 5, 113 S.E. 570, 572 (1922)). See also Comment, supra note 6,
at 1136-43; Note, supra note 4.
25. 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956).
26. Id at 27-28, 92 S.E.2d at 396. What Justice Bobbitt said on this subject in that case is
worthy of quotation:
Emphasis is frequently given to the presence or absence of evidence of 'insult, indig-
nity, malice, oppression or bad motive' in determining the applicability of the doctrine to
a particular factual situation .... No decision of this Court dealing directly with the
doctrine of punitive damages as applied to an automobile collision case has come to our
attention....
There is no allegation in the amended complaint under consideration that the con-
duct of the driver of the Dawson car was either malicious or wilful. No inference can be
drawn that such driver intentionally caused the collision....
In general, exemplary damages may not be recovered in a case involving an ordi-
nary collision caused by negligence on a highway in the absence of any intentional,
1981] 2
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North Carolina decisions have interpreted each of these possibilities. A
person acts willfully when he acts knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily.27
A person acts wantonly when he acts "in conscious and intentional disregard
of and indifference to the rights and safety of others."28 Malice, however, is a
more difficult concept. The sometimes confusing nature of legal terminology
is illustrated by the use of the term "malice" to express two different concepts:
actual malice (malice in fact) and legal malice (malice in law). Actual malice
exists as a matter of fact and describes the state of mind of a person who
actually entertains personal hatred or ill will or spite towards another.29 Legal
malice does not necessarily involve hatred or ill will or spite, and is not a fact
to be proved specifically. On the contrary, the law infers its existence from the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse?30 Legal mal-
ice has no place in the doctrine of punitive damages because a person never
acts maliciously within the purview of that doctrine unless he commits an in-
tentional wrong motivated by his actual malice towards the party injured.3'
Thus, as Hinson v. Dawson32 clearly reveals, a jury has the discretionary
power to award punitive damages in proper cases only in these instances:
1. When the defendant knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily com-
mits an actionable legal wrong upon the person or property of the plaintiff.
2. When the defendant acts in conscious and intentional disregard of
malicious or wilful act.... In the absence of allegation that the conduct was malicious
or wilful, there is no basis for submission of an issue as to punitive damages unless the
facts alleged justify the allegation (by way of conclusion) that the conduct was wanton.
References to gross negligence as a basis for recovery of punitive damages may be
found in our decisions.... When an injury is caused by negligence, any attempt to
differentiate variations from slight to gross is fraught with maximum difficulty....
Moreover, the words "reckless" and "heedless" would seem to import an uncertain de-
gree of negligence somewhat short of wantonness.
An analysis of our decisions impels the conclusion that this Court, in references to
gross negligence, has used that term in the sense of wanton conduct. Negligence, a fail-
ure to use due care, be it slight or extreme, connotes inadvertance. Wantonness, on the
other hand, connotes intentional wrongdoing. Where malicious or wilful injury is not
involved, wanton conduct must be alleged and shown to warrant the recovery of punitive
damages. Conduct is wanton when in conscious and intentional disregard of, and indif-
ference to, the rights and safety of others.
Id (citations omitted).
27. Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 296, 182 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1971); Givens v. Seller, 273
N.C. 44, 49, 159 S.E.2d 530, 535 (1968); West v. West, 199 N.C. 12, 15, 153 S.E. 600, 602 (1930);
Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 148 S.E. 36 (1929); Bailey v. North Carolina R.R., 149 N.C. 169,
174, 62 S.E. 912, 913-14 (1908); Brown v. Brown, 124 N.C. 19, 21, 32 S.E. 320, 321 (1899).
28. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23,28,92 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1956); Robinson v. Duszynski, 36
N.C. App. 103, 106, 243 S.E.2d 148, 150 (1978).
29. Swain v. Oakey, 190 N.C. 113, 129 S.E. 151 (1925).
30. Pittsburg, Johnstown, Edensburg and E. R.R. Co. v. Wakefield Hardware Co., 138 N.C.
174, 180, 50 S.E. 571, 573 (1905).
31. Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 171, 147 S.E.2d 910, 914 (1966); Swain v. Oakey, 190 N.C.
113, 129 S.E. 151 (1925); Brown v. Martin, 176 N.C. 31, 33, 96 S.E. 642, 643 (1918). Accord,
Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976); Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co.,
274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E.2d 761 (1968); Lutz Indus. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 344, 88
S.E.2d 333, 342 (1955); East Coast Dev. Corp. v. Alderman-250 Corp., 30 N.C. App. 598, 228
S.E.2d 72 (1976). See also Brandis & Trotter, supra note 2, at 250.
32. 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956).
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and indifference to the rights and safety of the plaintiff, and by so doing inflicts
an actionable legal wrong upon the person or property of the plaintiff.
3. When the defendant commits an actionable legal wrong upon the
person or property of the plaintiff and is motivated to do so by the actual
malice (the personal hatred, ill will or spite) he entertains for the plaintiff.
Inasmuch as they are allowable only in cases of wilful, malicious, or wan-
ton wrongs, punitive damages can never be awarded to a plaintiff when his
injury results from the defendant's simple negligence. 33 Similarly, punitive
damages are not allowable in an action for a nuisance arising out of the mere
unreasonable use of the defendant's property.
34
When a plaintiff seeks an award of punitive damages, the intention and
the motives with which the defendant acted are material and constitute proper
subjects of inquiry.35 Punitive damages are not allowable when the defendant
commits an intentional act in goodfaith and in the honest belief that he has the
right to do so even though the act causes actual damage to the plaintiff.
36
33. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956); Lutz Indus. v. Dixie Home Stores,
242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955); Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N.C. 567, 55 S.E.2d 28
(1939); Smith v. Myers, 188 N.C. 551, 125 S.E. 178 (1924); Ballew v. Asheville & E.T.R. Co., 186
N.C. 704, 120 S.E. 334 (1923); Ford v. McAnally, 182 N.C. 419, 109 S.E. 91 (1921); Cobb v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 175 N.C. 130, 95 S.E. 92 (1918).
34. Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 175 N.C. 130, 95 S.E. 92 (1918).
35. Hansley v. Jamesville & W. R.R., 115 N.C. 602, 20 S.E. 528 (1894).
36. Lay v. Gazette Publishing Co., 209 N.C. 134, 183 S.E. 416 (1936); Hays v. Askew, 52 N.C.
(7 Jones) 272 (1859). In Lay, the supreme court held that punitive damages cannot be assessed
against a newspaper for publishing a false report of plaintiffs arrest if "the publication was in
good faith, and was the result of an honest mistake.' 209 N.C. 134, 139, 183 S.E. 416, 419 (1936).
In Hays, the defendant conveyed land, reserving a right of way through a certain avenue, and
subsequently built a house on that avenue so close to the house of the grantee as to darken it and
otherwise diminish its value. The defendant built the house under the belief that he had the right
to do so. The supreme court adjudged that punitive damages could not be recovered by the plain-
tiff. 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 272, 273-74 (1859).
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